INTRODUCTION
I have been following, with
interest, Dr. Nowa Omoigui's Nigerian-military-history-soaked "Weekend
Musings". His latest one is simply titled: May
30, 1967 with a lead-in:
"The month of May 1967
in the affairs of Nigeria was as dynamic and turbulent as any other in our
history. It moved with breath taking speed, crystallizing in its wake,
the final common pathway of momentous developments that were to culminate in
the declaration of Biafra on May 30."
So Biafra was on Nowa's mind
- and so I place it on mine too today, as I retrieve from my deep archives a
fair-use serialization that I first provided back in October 1996 - March
1997. It was from General Alexander Madiebo's book "The Nigerian
Revolution and the Biafran War", Fourth Dimension Publishers, Enugu
(1980), 411 pages. Madiebo was Commander Biafran Army.
At the end of the Madiebo
excerpt, I have added some historical notes of my own, including additional
excerpts from other sources:
-
explanatory chapters from
Madiebo's book itself other than the main Chapter 5;
-
Awo's May 1, 1967 Ibadan
speech (the so-called "East goes, West goes" declaration.
The national question and resource control aspects of this speech
remain eerily relevant today;
-
Enugu conversation
between Awo (and his delegation) and Ojukwu (May 6, 1967);
-
Ojukwu's Declaration of
the Republic of Biafra speech (May 30)
Enjoy.
Bolaji Aluko
--------------------------------------------
The Nigerian Revolution and
the Biafran War
Major-General Alexander A.
Madiebo, Rtd. Commander Biafran Army
Fourth Dimension Publishers,
Enugu (1980), 411 pages 179 Zik Avenue, PMB 1164, Enugu, Nigeria
--------------------------------------
CHAPTER 5
THE GATHERING STORM
The Final Plunge (Page 92 ff)
The news that Colonel Ojukwu
was in Aburi, Ghana, with other Military Governors on the 4th January, 1967 to
try to find a peaceful solution to the current disturbances in the country
came as an encouraging surprise to me and to many other senior military
officers in the Eastern Region. At the end of the two-day conference
some important decisions were reached, among which were:
-
The immediate resumption
of the Ad-Hoc Committee to work out the constitutional future of Nigeria.
-
The payment of salaries
until 31st of March, 1967 of all staff and employees of Government and
Statutory Corporations and any others who were forced to leave their posts
as a result of the disturbances.
-
The setting up, in the
meantime, of a committee to look into the problem of rehabilitation of
displaced persons and the recovery of their property.
-
The exclusion of the use
of force as a means of settling any difference within the country.
-
The repealing of all
decrees which tended to overcentralise power at the expense of Regional
autonomy. This would be followed by the enactment of a decree before
the 21st of January, to restore the Regions to their political position
prior to January 15, 1966.
On the advice of some Federal
senior civil servants, most of whom were acting on foreign advice, Gowon
rejected most of these decision, particularly those pertaining to the payment
of displaced persons and the reconvening of the Ad Hoc Constitutional
Conference. As a follow-up, Gowon enacted Decree no. 8 which gave him
power to declare a state of emergency in any Region irrespective of the wishes
of the Governor of that Region. Later Gowon published these as the
official outcome of the Aburi conference. The above measures were a
clear indication that Gowon was no longer giving much consideration to the
possibility of a peaceful solution. Rather he was preparing the ground
for the use of force.
The Eastern Nigerian
Government, then absolutely helpless, passed a couple of Edicts to protect the
interests of its people and avoid a total economic collapse of the Region.
These Edicts were meant to serve as temporary relief while a more permanent
solution was being sought.
Foremost among these Edicts were the Registration of
Companies Edict, the Revenue Collection Edict and the Court of Appeal Edict.
As a punishment for these measures taken by the Eastern Nigeria Government,
the Lagos Government imposed economic sanctions on the Eastern Region.
As a result of the
deteriorating situation, Colonel Ojukwu convened a meeting of the Advisory
Committee of Chiefs and Elders at Enugu, on the 26th of May, 1967, to acquaint
them with the latest developments and seek their decision.
He gave the committee alternative solutions to the crises:
-
To accept the terms of
the North and Gowon and thereby submit to domination by the North; or
-
To continue the present
stalemate and drift; or
-
Ensure the survival of
the people by asserting their autonomy.
On the 27th of May, the
Consultative Assembly mandated Colonel Ojukwu "to declare, at the
earliest practicable date, Eastern Nigeria a free sovereign and independent
state by the name and title of the Republic of Biafra." Lagos'
reaction to this was swift and immediate for Gowon at once announced a new
constitution for Nigeria based upon the division of the existing four Regions
into twelve States. By the arrangement, the Eastern Region was
unilaterally split into three States: Rivers, East Central and South Eastern
States [SEE NOTE 1].
Completely engulfed in an
apparently misguided optimism, we perhaps spent by far too much time and money
on propaganda with little left for military preparations. When the Head
of State of Biafra told the nation that no country in black Africa could
defeat by land, air or sea, the nation went wild with joy and thought that any
further delay on our part in launching an attack against Nigeria was
senseless. Yet the Commanders of the Army, Navy and the Air Force had
not been told where the forces referred to were stationed [SEE NOTE 2]. Even
the announcement by the Head of State that if we were attacked the grass would
fight for us, was taken literally by many, who were beginning to ask for
nothing but war. In an attempt to demonstrate the strength of the
Biafran Army, Colonel Ojukwu took some top civilians to the firing range of
the First Battalion at Enugu. There, some newly acquired machine guns
and automatic rifles were displayed and later fired. The noise produced
was impressive and sufficiently indicative of strength. When Chief
Awolowo visited Enugu, just before the outbreak of war, two helicopters
painted in Army colors, put up a short demonstration for him to illustrate our
air power. When the helicopters finally landed on the grounds of the
State House, and the fierce-looking pilots jumped out smartly, it was clear
that the chief from Yorubaland was highly impressed. [SEE NOTE 3]
With the people's minds thus
prepared for war, demonstrations were organised and held all over the country
demanding immediate action against Nigeria. Everywhere the cry on everybody's
lips was "Ojukwu Nyeanyi Egbe" (Ojukwu give us weapons.) Finally, on
the 30th May, 1967, the Head of State declared Eastern Nigeria an independent
and sovereign state of Biafra. [SEE NOTE 4] In doing this, he was merely
acting in accordance with the mandate given to him earlier by the people. The
mandate had authorised him to do so "at the earliest practicable
date." Almost all senior army officers thought the answer to that
question was an unqualified "No." The thought of being
independent of Nigeria was simply glorious but to make this is a reality was
going to be a miracle; yet there was universal jubilation.
By June, expatriates began to
leave Biafra because of mounting pressures to do so from both the Lagos
Government and their respective embassies. I remember some American
staff, at the University of Nigeria, paid me a visit at my Nsukka
Headquarters, on 4th July, 1967 to seek advice on the question of leaving
Biafra. They disclosed that they had been told by Lagos to leave Nsukka
immediately for Gowon's Army would go through that town on 6th July, 1967.
While admitting the fact that the situation was very critical, I explained to
them that Gowon's march through Nsukka, if it took place, would be resisted,
and certainly long enough to allow them to pack up and leave the town or even
the country. I however pointed out that the choice to remain in or leave
Biafra rested entirely on them in the final analysis. I think they
stayed on till the outbreak of the war when I also realised the significance
of the date they had mentioned. [SEE NOTE 5]
Later on that day, Dr. Nnamdi
Azikiwe, also at Nsukka, called me to seek advice. He pointed out that, if all
stories he had heard were to be true, and if all outstanding threats from
Lagos were to be executed, Nsukka would be unsafe for civilians pretty soon.
He was therefore contemplating a move from Nsukka after he should have heard
from me. My advice was that a move before the outbreak of hostilities
would be premature as the direction of the initial invasion was not known.
End of Madiebo Excerpt
-----------------------
MOBOLAJI ALUKO NOTES ON
MADIEBO EXCERPT
----------------------
NOTE 1
Rapid Activities on Both
Sides
Nigeria was existing as a
federation of three regions (Northern, Western and Eastern Regions) on the day
of the first coup, January 15, 1966. On May 24, 1966, General
Aguiyi-Ironsi abolished the regions by decree [Federal Government Decree no.
34 (Unification Decree)], replacing the Federal structure with a unitary
government. He was assassinated in a counter-coup in July 1966 while
touring the nation, [See Note 1a below] with Gowon becoming the new Head of
State soon thereafter.
Following the Eastern Region
Consultative Assembly meeting in Enugu mandating Biafrans secessionist action,
on the very same day, May 27, 1967, Gowon issued a decree, dividing Nigeria
into twelve states:
-
North:North-Western,
North-Central, Kano, North-Eastern, Benue-Plateau, Kwara
-
West:Lagos, Western
-
Midwest:Midwestern
-
East:East-Central,
Rivers, South-Eastern
By June 3, Gowon appointed
eleven civilians to the Federal Executive Council, making Chief Obafemi
Awolowo the Vice-Chairman and Federal Minister of Finance. Others
included Chief Anthony Enahoro (Information), J.S. Tarka, Alhaji Aminu Kano,
and Wenike Briggs . The full Council included members from each of the
twelve new states. Ukpabi Asika, Social Science lecturer at the
University of Ibadan, became Administrator of East Central State in October
1967, after the fall of Enugu. Ken Saro-Wiwa, lecturer in English at the
University of Lagos, at age 26 was appointed the Administrator of Bonny
(Island) on November 11, 1967, while his father was still in Umuahia, Biafra
(till the tail end of the war.) Three months later, Saro-Wiwa began working in
Bonny very closely with then Colonel (now retired General) Akinrinade till
September 1968 [See Note 1b].
Note 1a: MADIEBO, page
56 ff:
"Even at that late and
very dark hour, while the North was putting finishing touches to their [COUP]
plan, Ironsi was still confident he would reverse the ugly situation. He
hoped to do this by touring all regions of Nigeria to explain to their leaders
the merits and good intentions of Decree no. 34 and to reassure them
generally. All Southern leaders - army and police officers, politicians,
intellectual sand others - who could reach Ironsi advised him against
undertaking such a tour but he was determined to go ahead with it.
Ironsi first visited the
North, and there it was an arduous effort to restrain young Northern Nigerian
officers from seizing advantage of his visit to commence their coup.
What actually happened was that the more mature Northerners and their advisers
did not want Ironsi killed in the North. Neither did they want to risk a
confrontation with him in Lagos where all major units were being commanded by
Ibos, with whose help he could easily foil the coup before it gained momentum.
Midwestern Nigeria was unsuitable for such an operation because no troops were
stationed there and a sudden movement of troops towards the Region would have
alerted him. It was clear that Western Region was going to be the
battleground for it satisfied all the necessary requirements. The only
battalion in Western Nigeria was under the command of a Northerner, Colonel
Joe Akahan, and the men on the exercise would be dealing with an indifferent
population.
That Ironsi himself realised
the dangers he faced was doubtful, but he was advised by all who knew the true
situation to halt his tour and remain in Lagos for awhile. However, he
was determined to continue his tour.
When he came back from
Northern Nigeria, he left for Midwestern Nigeria on the 27th of July and, as
expected, never returned.............
Page 62 ff
[Captain Dilibe, an Ibo Staff
Officer at the First Brigade Headquarters....] revealed that Ironsi had
telephoned the Brigade Headquarters from Ibadan at 0730 hours [ON THE
29th JULY] to say that the Government House where he was staying was
surrounded by soldiers. Ironsi also informed the Brigade that he
had already made several attempts to get a helicopter sent to him from
Lagos but had failed......................
Page 85 ff
Ironsi's Air Force ADC,
Captain Nwankwo, who was with Ironsi at the time of his death, later told us
the story in Enugu of how the General died. According to Nwankwo, at
0630 hours on the 29th of July 1966,Ironsi, Fajuyi, the Governor of Western
Nigeria and himself were arrested at Government House, Ibadan by Northern
troops under the command of Captain Danjuma. Colonel Hilary Njoku, who
was also present, escaped with multiple bullet wounds. The troops used
to affect the arrests were those detailed to protect the General during his
tour. The captives were driven to an isolated jungle just outside Ibadan.
By the time they got there, the prisoners had been so thoroughly beaten that
the older two - Ironsi and Fajuyi - could hardly stand up. Shortly
after, Fajuyi was shot, then Ironsi.
While Ironsi was being shot,
Nwankwo said he ran into the bush and escaped. He emphasized that his escape
was not due to his cleverness, but because his colleague, the Hausa ADC who
was also present, wanted him to escape.
Nwankwo explained that during
the month of June, 1966, he and his Northern colleague had discussed the
possibility of another coup. The Northern officer was emphatic the Ibos were
going to do it again, but Nwankwo swore it was going to be done by
Northerners. According to him, at the end of a long but heated argument, they
came to an agreement that whichever side did it, the man on the winning
side should save the other's life. Based on this agreement, the
Northern ADC whispered t Nwankwo to escape while Ironsi was being shot,
and also discouraged the soldiers from chasing after him. Nwankwo
said he later made his way to Lagos and contacted this Northern officer
again, who not only hid him for a couple of days, but eventually took
him out of Lagos in the boot of a car.
Note 1b: Saro-Wiwa and
Akinrinade
To learn about the deep
admiration for Akinrinade by Saro-Wiwa, read his "On a Darkling Plain: An
Account of the Nigerian Civil War.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTE 2
Ojukwu's Top Military Echelon
Although somewhat
anachronistic, this note is to put on record a note to be found below a
picture on Page 323 of Madiebo's book:
"Biafran top commanders
at Isu watching a parade to mark the 2nd Anniversary of Biafra's independence
in 1969. Standing left to right: Colonel E. Udeaja (parade commander),
Wing Commander W. Ezeilo (Air Force Commander), Colonel S. Ogunewe (Military
Aid to Head of State), Major General P. Efiong (Chief of Defence Staff),
General C. Ojukwu (Head of State), Major General A. Madiebo (Commander Biafran
Army), Mr. P. Okeke (Inspector General of Police), Caption F. Anuku (Navy
Commander). "
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTE 3
The Awo Delegation Trip to
Enugu
Page 94 is the last page in
Madiebo's 411-page book in which "the chief from Yorubaland",
Obafemi Awolowo, is mentioned. Chief Awolowo had this opportunity to be
"highly impressed", because at or around May 5 - 9, 1967, he was the
head of a four-man National Conciliation Committee delegation.
Page 78 of Saro-Wiwa:
" On a Darkling Plain: An Account of the Nigerian Civil War":
"The professional
criers, as might be expected, were also hard at work bemoaning the suspected
demise of the Federation. They sent a delegation to Enugu to make peace
proposals. The composition of the delegation was quite interesting:
Chief Awolowo, Leader of the Yorubas; a Yoruba economist, Dr. Aluko, who was
given to writing "intellectual" articles and virulent criticisms of
Government and had served for a stormy while at the University of Nigeria, and
two other dignitaries from the Mid-Western Region [CHIEF JERETON MARIERE AND
CHIEF J.I.G. ONYIA], one of them having Ibo sympathies..............
An excerpt from my Naijanet
archives of June 19, 1995 details a record of the conversation between Ojukwu
and Awolowo during this historic meeting:
------------------------
BEQIN POSTING: AWO-OJUKWU
ENUGU CONVERSATION
I have excerpted below an
unpublished response (by one Mr. Lanre Banjo) to an article titled "Igbo
Leaders Vow Never to Fight for Yorubas, Fear Another Betrayal" in a March
issue of "The Nigerian Times" published by Dr. Chika A. Onyeani of
New York. My focus here is not on the views of the excerptor (Banjo) but
on the recorded conversation between Awo and Ojukwu. This excerpt
obviously can not be all of their conversation, but the authenticity and
information that this short piece provides is there for us to judge.
-------------------------------
Begin Excerpt ------------------------
.........
........[STUFF DELETED].
.........
... Here is the true account
of what took place as taken from scripts of the discussion between Papa and
Chief Ojukwu (the Ikemba). The discussion was taped by the Ikemba and
the recorder was captured after Enugu fell.
On Saturday, May 6, 1967, at
5.15 pm, a meeting began to take place, at the State House, Enugu, between the
then Excellency, Lt. Col.
Odumegwu Ojukwu (the Ikemba) and a delegation of the
National Conciliation Committee (Committee) led by the most Honorable Chief
Obafemi Awolowo. The Committee was represented by Professor Samuel
Aluko, Chief Mariere, Chief J.I. Onyia, while the Eastern Region was
represented by Lt. Col Imo, Lt. Col Effiong, Lt. Col. Kurubo, Mr. C.O Mojekwu,
Mr. N.U. Akpan, Professor Eni Njoku, Dr. Nwakanma Okoro, Dr. P.N.C. Okigbo,
Mr. C.A. Onyegbale and Mr. Ndem with the Ikemba presiding over the meeting.
The names are listed for the purpose of verification of facts presented herein
below with those of them who may still be alive..............
.......
Papa: The main concern
of these delegates is to ensure that Nigeria does not disintegrate, and
I would like to see Nigeria bound together by any bond because it is
better than breaking the whole place up because each unit will be the
loser for it.
The economy of the country is so integrated that it
is too late in the day to try and sever them without risking the death
of one or both of them. So we have come, therefore, to appeal
to you to let Eastern representatives attend the meeting of the
Committee (ON-GOING NATIONAL CONCILIATION MEETING) I do not want to put
myself in a position where I will be treated as an advocate of the
Eastern cause. Let the Eastern delegates go there, make their case
and then as a member of the Committee I will get up and say I support
this entirely. If at the meeting the East and West present what
they want for a new Nigeria whether temporarily or permanently, and the
North says "no, we are not going to have it", I will go out
and address a World Press Conference and send our case to that body and
say this is what we have done and the North has turned it down.
I will then take any step that is necessary to bring
into effect what we want. The North needed to be in a position of
being presented with the United front of the South.
Ikemba: I started off
this struggle in July with 120 rifles to defend the entirety of the East.
I took my stand knowing fully well that by doing so, whilst carving my name in
history, I was signing also my death warrant. But I took it because I
believe that this stand is vital to the survival of the South. I
appealed for settlement quietly because I understood that this was a
naked struggle for power and that the only time we can sit down and decide the
future of Nigeria on basis of equality will always be equality of arms.
Quietly, I built up. If you do not know it, I am proud, and my officers
are proud, that here in the East we possess the biggest army in Black Africa.
I am no longer speaking as an underdog, I am speaking from a position of
power. [SEE NOTE 3a] The only way for the South to present a united
front is for the South to meet and hammer out that united front. It is a
point which must be cleared first before proceeding to make a statement of
whatever it is. That is why to my mind, at the present stage of the
crisis the ideal thing is for the Southern people to meet in any platform and
discuss and hammer out any difference they might have because I will have
nothing to do with the North.
Then going further, it would then mean that to do this the
South to meet; because if we wait for their permission, we will wait for ever.
On the specific question of whether there is a possibility of contract with
the North, the answer is at the battle field.
Papa: I do appreciate the
points you have made, especially the suggestion the South could take the bull
by the horns, convene a meeting of its leaders and work out its salvation.
Well, I must say that a number of factors have been overlooked in this regard.
I would be quite willing to attend any meeting convened by
the leaders of the South in the South, but it must be realized that we in the
West are in a very difficult position. All the members of the bodyguard
of the Military Governor of the Western Region were Northerners; there were
over 36,000 soldiers in the whole of the West, most of whom were Northerners,
and all of them carry arms..... I led a delegation to Lt. Col. Gowon on the
7th and at that interview I made it clear on behalf of the West that if the
soldiers of Northern origin were not removed from the West we would not attend
any further meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee. He said he would do
something, of course he did not.
We passed our resolution (THAT THE NORTHERN SOLDIERS SHOULD
BE REMOVED FROM THE WEST) and Col. Adebayo did very well and give us certain
Yoruba officers with whom to go and deliver the petition to Lt. Col. Gowon.
I did give him an ultimatum up to the 15th of May to remove these Northern
soldiers from the West. Of course, he agreed to remove them by the 31st
of May but the time we returned to Ibadan Northern soldiers had taken up arms
and wanted to kill me, to kill Adebayo and all others.
Just now Adebayo does not sleep in his house.
Somebody told me that he has not been sleeping in his house. I know why
they put two policemen with two rifles in front of my house the other day.
Of course, I rang up and said I wanted them removed. There were
policemen in front of Sardauna's house but they did not save him. The
populace, of course, turned against the Northern soldiers. I don't know why
Adebayo should issue the release that soldiers should not be taunted.
But this is the way we have been doing our quiet fighting. You are
remote from the West; you have advantages which we do not possess. We
cannot rush without rushing to our death at the same time. We are not
cowards in the West but we have to move cautiously, because if we do not do
that you might not have us alive; you would only have monuments all over the
place.
And I may say in this connection of Southern solidarity --
I am sorry to go into what has happened in the past -- in 1953 there was an
understanding between the banned NCNC and the banned Action Group; we entered
into an agreement, which I hope we will use sometime, to the effect that if
the North remained intransigent we would declare a Southern Dominion.
This was signed by myself and Zik and I still stand by it; but we prefer
that you should send your delegates to this meeting, so that we should, known
to everyone, enter into negotiations among ourselves and present a common
front to the North. Then nobody can accuse us of conspiracy or trying to
divide the country into two parts. I want you to look at it from our
point of view. If there were no Northern soldiers in the West the
position would be different.
And even if by the time I return home the Northern soldiers
have gone I still do not want to be accused of perfidy. The issue at
hand is not enough for us to say that we do not like the North.
That is a negative approach. I think a positive
approach will be for us to meet. Unity will last only if it is based on
common understanding among us and the basis will start at this meeting.
As I said before, I want you to give me a chance of meeting
your people regularly. Let us resolve our differences and get what we
want and quickly too.
Ikemba: If the reason
is to get a platform for a meeting between the Southern leaders, I agree very
much that we should try and find a platform and here we seem to be presented
with a fait accompli.
The Southern leaders are here now, so the main thing is to
go on and discuss.
Papa: It will be something
near fraud for us to sit down here and discuss in terms of the South
especially as this delegation was sent here by a body consisting of the
Northern delegation....
Ikemba: Now coming to
the wider question of the East attending, if it is a Reconciliation Committee
then it must be reconciling warring parties. A Reconciliation Committee
can not have the parties within, somehow, it does not work, unless, of course,
they have already agreed on the major issues, because reconciliation is to
stay in the middle of the warring parties. And one thing is so clear in
the Nigerian situation: certainly the North and the East are warring.
For any Reconciliation Committee to do justice to the East, it should not have
Easterners and Northerners in it. That is one point. How does the
Reconciliation Committee expect us to go to Lagos ? Can you, Sir,
imagine Sir Kashim Ibrahim coming to the East to meet and discuss ? The
critical point of the Eastern stand is that the East cannot go to any place
where there are Northern troops. That tells his own story.
The North has made it abundantly clear that no association
if they are not controlling the central machinery, is acceptable to them.
Even in the face of the resolutions of the South, the Emirs, feudalist Emirs,
had the audacity to dictate to the South; first that they will not allow the
Northern troops to leave the West until they are satisfied that the West has
got sufficient troops.
Papa: You have talked about
Easterners and Northerners trying to go to the same meeting and bringing about
reconciliation because they are the two warring parties. I do not think
the fight is between the East and the North alone. It affects all other
parts of the country save that there is no quarrel between the East and the
West and Mid-West. The fight involves all of us. The West at this
moment, has its own complaints against the North. The fact that we went
there particularly so soon after my withdrawal from the Ad Hoc Constitutional
Committee, which I observed was set up by the Federal Government to wage war
against the East instead of trying to put things in check, must assure you
that we are resolved to find a solution to this.
You have also spoken about Lagos or anywhere in the West as
unsafe for the Easterners to hold a meeting. Nobody can tell when life
will be lost, but I think, speaking the minds of entire people of Western
Nigeria and Mid-Western Nigeria, that if anybody can at this stage take the
life of an Ibo man or an Easterner, or if any outstanding Eastern loses his
life by the act of someone else, the whole of the Western Region and the
Mid-Western Region will take it as the end of Nigeria. I can give that
assurance on behalf of Western Nigeria and Lagos."
[End of all the Awo-Ojukwu
quotations in the excerpt - Mr. Lanre's Banjo continues:]
This meeting was concluded on
Sunday, 7th of May at about 2.15 pm with the hope to reconvene and with the
Ikemba maintaining that the South must first meet. Before I go further,
it would be noted that the Ikemba's view was maintained due to hindsight (sic:
LACK OF FORESIGHT). First, Papa has just been released from prison for a
charge of treasonable felony.
Secondly, he was in Enugu representing the Nigerian
National Conciliation Committee. How could Ikemba expect him to change
and focus on Southern plan of pulling out of Nigeria ? Papa was more
principled than that.
Even prior to his meeting with the Ikemba, he had been
falsely accused of having teamed up with the Ikemba in his campaign against
the Federal Military Government by being in regular touch with him by phone
calls and personal visits to Enugu, to perfect their joint plans. That
he had been sending Professor Aluko and others to Enugu for illegal guerrilla
training. Given this situation, a sudden change to discuss how the South
will unite against the North will definitely confirm the dreadful and blatant
accusations already levelled against him.............
[STUFF DELETED]
------------------------
End of Excerpt ---------------------------------
END OF MY JUNE 19, 1995
POSTING
--------------------------------
Now, Back to Page 78 of
Saro-Wiwa:
"It cannot be believed
that the [AWOLOWO'S ENUGU] delegation was expected to achieve much.
They probably obtained certain promises from Ojukwu,
for they returned to Lagos with proposals which were said to have been
agreed by Ojukwu.
The Federal Government was to lift the economic
blockade placed on the Eastern Region in some respects, a gesture which
Ojukwu would reciprocate by abrogating some of the laws he had passed
confiscating certain properties and assets of the Federal Government.
Gowon, acting in good faith, immediately accepted the
proposals and began to implement them. But Ojukwu had no
intention of accepting any proposals whatsoever, except that which was
by now uppermost in his mind: secession. He was considerably
encouraged by a statement made by Chief Awolowo [IN IBADAN ON MAY 1,
1967] which has remained controversial ever since. Chief
Awolowo had said that "If the Eastern Region is allowed by acts of
omission or commission to secede from or opt out of Nigeria, then
the Western Region and Lagos must also stay out of the Federation."
The Ibo leadership immediately interpreted Awolowo's statement to mean
that if Eastern Nigeria seceded, the West would follow suit.
They may have been encouraged in that interpretation
as much by the erratic parts of Awolowo's speech [SEE NOTE 6] wherein he
called for a peaceful solution to the problem and trenchantly
opposed any war against the rest by the "North", as by the
fact that only a short while before, the Yoruba West had called for the
removal of "northern" troops from the Western Region.
The Government of the West had subsequently banned the "Morning
Post", as Ojukwu had done earlier. The Federal Government had
not been able to make its authority felt in either of these cases.
Indeed, by the end of the month, it had accepted publicly to
withdraw non-Yoruba troops from the West."
Note 3a An addition in
Saro-Wiwa's book
In Saro-Wiwa's "On A
Darkling Plain.." version of this same portion of the conversation, an
addition at this very point is:
"It is not my intention
to unleash the destruction which my army can unleash. It is not my
intention to fight until I am attacked. If I am attacked, I will take
good care of the aggressor."
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTE 4
Ojukwu's Declaration of
Biafra's Secession
Page 193 ff Ojukwu: "Biafra:
Selected Speeches with Journals of Events", (1969)
"Fellow countrymen and
women, YOU, the people of Eastern Nigeria:
CONSCIOUS of the supreme
authority of Almighty God over all mankind, of your duty to yourselves
and posterity; AWARE that you can no longer be protected in your lives
and in your property by any government based outside Eastern Nigeria;
BELIEVING that you are born free and have certain inalienable rights
which be best preserved by yourselves; UNWILLING to be unfree partners
in any association of a political or economic nature; REJECTING
the authority of any person or persons other than the Military
Government of Eastern Nigeria to make any imposition of whatever kind or
nature upon you; DETERMINED to dissolve all political and other ties
between you and the former Federal Republic of Nigeria; PREPARED
to enter into such association, treaty or alliance with any sovereign
state within the former Federal Republic of Nigeria and elsewhere on
such terms and condition as best to subserve your common good;
AFFIRMING your trust and confidence in ME; HAVING mandate ME to proclaim
on your behalf, in your name, that Eastern Nigeria be a sovereign
independent Republic, NOW THEREFORE I, LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHUKWUEMEKA
ODUMEGWU OJUKWU, MILITARY GOVERNOR OF EASTERN NIGERIA, BY VIRTUE OF THE
AUTHORITY, AND PURSUANT TO THE PRINCIPLES, RECITED ABOVE, DO HEREBY
SOLEMNLY PROCLAIM THAT THE TERRITORY AND REGION KNOWN AS AND CALLED
EASTERN NIGERIA TOGETHER WITH HER CONTINENTAL SHELF AND TERRITORIAL
WATERS SHALL HENCEFORTH BE AN INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN STATE OF THE
NAME AND TITLE OF "THE REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA." AND I DO
DECLARE THAT:
-
all political ties
between us and the Federal Republic of Nigeria are hereby totally
dissolved;
-
all subsisting
contractual obligations entered into by the Government of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria or by any person, authority,
organization, or government acting on its behalf, with any
person, authority, or organisation, or relating to any matter or
thing, within the Republic of Biafra, shall henceforth be deemed to
be entered into with the Military Governor of the Republic of Biafra
for and on behalf of the Government and people of the Republic of
Biafra, and the covenants thereof shall, subject to this
Declaration, be performed by the parties according to their
tenor............
-
it is our intention to
remain a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations in our right
as a sovereign independent nation.
LONG LIVE THE REPUBLIC OF
BIAFRA! AND MAY GOD PROTECT ALL WHO LIVE IN HER. "
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTE 5
A Personal Anecdote
I cannot resist a personal
anecdote here, because my family was one of those who sought advice and had to
evacuate from the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. From my deep archives here on
Naijanet, on August 11, 1994, in response to a very provocative piece by Dr.
Sola Adeyeye, I had written, inter alia:
BEGIN QUOTE:
"...First, my father,
Prof. Sam Aluko, was an activist economist staunchly in Awolowo's camp during
all of this struggle, one of the young intellectual "Turks"
(including Oluwasanmi) that Awolowo so much enjoyed their company. He (along
with several others) was one of the very first university professors ever
dismissed for political reasons in Nigeria, by Chief Akintola (in 1963/64)
during the problems preceding the Western Region debacle. He was tried and
sentenced for sedition, and upon refusing to pay the fine, received
"forced" contributions from those present at the courthouse,
otherwise he would have been hauled into jail ! It was his dismissal that
forced him to go to take up appointment (and become Head of Dept. of Econs.)
at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka in 1964 (notice: he could not have
gone to NSUKKA in 1964, three years BEFORE THE SECESSION if there was so much
hate between Igbos and Yorubas !). This move threw him into the thick of
Eastern Region politics - he toured Aba, Onitsha, Arochukwu, Calabar,
Ikot-Ekpene, Port Harcourt, all on behalf of the Action Group. I
remember distinctly going with him to the broadcasting station in Enugu
several times during the rigged elections in the Western Region, from where
the Action Group announced its own "cooked " versions of the results
for good measure !. I remember distinctly Wole Soyinka bursting into our home
one night in Nsukka unannounced when he was being sought in the Western Region
for attempting to assassinate Chief Akintola at the Ibadan TV Station.
On the eve of the secession,
my father led a long caravan of students and faculty group of non-Igbos away
from Nsukka, meeting others at Onitsha, despite entreaties from Ojukwu not to
leave; Ojukwu was and remains a personal friend of his. He was
however to return to Enugu as one of four eminent persons sent by Gowon
(delegation led by Chief Awolowo) to persuade Ojukwu not to lead Biafra to
secede, at which point Ojukwu disclosed that the momentum to secede was too
far to stop the effort, that in fact his life would be in danger if he
broached a retreat, but that he believed that the secession would be
short-lived, and he would do everything in his power to make it so. Of
course, history proved him wrong, but these are some truths (if you will
permit me to be so blunt) that never come out in
conversations..........."
END QUOTE
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTE 6
Speech by Chief Obafemi
Awolowo made to the Western leaders of thought, in Ibadan, 1 May 1967.
(Culled from Daily Times, 2 May 1967) and quoted in "Crisis and Conflict
in Nigeria (Volume 1), January 1966-July 1971" by A.
H. M. Kirk-Greene.
BEGIN QUOTE:
" Awolowo Promises West
will secede if the East does
------------------------------------------------
The aim of a leader should be
the welfare of the people whom he leads. I have used 'welfare' to denote the
physical, mental and spiritual well-being of the people. With this aim fixed
unflinchingly and unchangeably before my eyes I consider it my duty to Yoruba
people in particular and to Nigerians in general, to place four imperatives
before you this morning. Two of them are categorical and two are
conditional.
Only a peaceful solution must be found to arrest the
present worsening stalemate and restore normalcy. The Eastern Region must be
encouraged to remain part of the Federation. If the Eastern Region is
allowed by acts of omission or commission to secede from or opt out of
Nigeria, then the Western Region and Lagos must also stay out of the
Federation. The people of Western Nigeria and Lagos should participate
in the ad hoc committee or any similar body only on the basis of absolute
equality with the other regions of the Federation.
I would like to comment
briefly on these four imperatives. There has, of late, been a good deal of
sabre rattling in some parts of the country. Those who advocate the use force
for the settlement of our present problems should stop a little and reflect. I
can see no vital and abiding principle involved in any war between the North
and the East. If the East attacked the North, it would be for purpose of
revenge pure and simple. Any claim to the contrary would be untenable. If it
is claimed that such a war is being waged for the purpose of recovering the
real and personal properties left behind in the North by Easterners two
insuperable points are obvious. Firstly, the personal effects left behind by
Easterners have been wholly looted or destroyed, and can no longer be
physically recovered. Secondly, since the real properties are immovable in
case of recovery of them can only be by means of forcible military occupation
of those parts of the North in which these properties are situated. On the
other hand, if the North attacked the East, it could only be for the purpose
of further strengthening and entrenching its position of dominance in the
country.
If it is claimed that an
attack on the East is going to be launched by the Federal Government and not
by the North as such and that it is designed to ensure the unity and integrity
of the Federation, two other insuperable points also become obvious. First, if
a war against the East becomes a necessity it must be agreed to unanimously by
the remaining units of the Federation. In this connection, the West, Mid- West
and Lagos have declared their implacable opposition to the use of force in
solving the present problem. In the face of such declarations by three out of
remaining four territories of Nigeria, a war against the East could only be a
war favoured by the North alone. Second, if the true purpose of such a war is
to preserve the unity and integrity of the Federation, then these ends can be
achieved by the very simple devices of implementing the recommendation of the
committee which met on August 9 1966, as reaffirmed by a decision of the
military leaders at Aburi on January 5 1967 as well as by accepting such of
the demands of the East, West, Mid-West and Lagos as are manifestly
reasonable, and essential for assuring harmonious relationships and peaceful
co--existence between them and their brothers and sisters in the North.
Some knowledgeable persons
have likened an attack on the East to Lincoln's war against the southern
states in America. Two vital factors distinguish Lincoln's campaign from the
one now being contemplated in Nigeria. The first is that the American civil
war was aimed at the abolition of slavery - that is the liberation of millions
of Negroes who were then still being used as chattels and worse than domestic
animals.
The second factor is that Lincoln and others in the
northern states were English-speaking people waging a war of good conscience
and humanity against their fellow nationals who were also English speaking. A
war against the East in which Northern soldiers are predominant, will only
unite the Easterners or the Ibos against their attackers, strengthen them in
their belief that they are not wanted by the majority of their
fellow-Nigerians, and finally push them out of the Federation.
We have been told that an act
of secession on the part of the East would be a signal, in the first instance,
for the creation of the COR state by decree, which would be backed, if need
be, by the use of force.
With great respect, I have some dissenting observations to
make on this declaration. There are 11 national or linguistic groups in the
COR areas with a total population of 5.3 millions. These national groups are
as distinct from one another as the Ibos are distinct from them or from the
Yorubas or Hausas. Of the 11, the Efik/Ibibio/Annang national group are 3.2
million strong as against the Ijaws who are only about 700,000 strong.
Ostensibly, the remaining nine national group number 1.4
millions. But when you have subtracted the Ibo inhabitants from among them,
what is left ranges from the Ngennis who number only 8,000 to the Ogonis who
are 220,000 strong. A decree creating a COR state without a plebiscite to
ascertain the wishes of the peoples in the area, would only amount to
subordinating the minority national groups in the state to the dominance of
the Efik/Ibibio/Annang national group. It would be perfectly in order to
create a Calabar state or a Rivers state by decree, and without a plebiscite.
Each is a homogeneous national unit. But before you lump distinct and diverse
national units together in one state, the consent of each of them is
indispensable. Otherwise, the seed of social disquilibrium in the new state
would have been sown.
On the other hand, if the COR
State is created by decree after the Eastern Region shall have made its
severance from Nigeria effective, we should then be waging an unjust war
against a foreign state. It would be an unjust war, because the purpose of it
would be to remove 10 minorities in the East from the dominance of the Ibos
only to subordinate them to the dominance of the Efik/Ibibio/Annang national
group. I think I have said enough to demonstrate that any war against the
East, or vice versa, on any count whatsoever, would be an unholy crusade, for
which it would be most unjustifiable to shed a drop of Nigerian blood.
Therefore, only a peaceful solution must be found, and quickly too to arrest
the present rapidly deteriorating stalemate and restore normalcy.
With regard to the second
categorical imperative, it is my considered view that whilst some of the
demands of the East are excessive within the context of a Nigerian union, most
of such demands are not only well founded, but are designed for smooth and
steady association amongst the various national units of Nigeria.
The dependence of the Federal
Government on financial contributions from the regions? These and other such
like demands I do not support. Demands such as these, if accepted, will lead
surely to the complete disintegration of the Federation which is not in the
interest of our people. But I wholeheartedly support the following demands
among others, which we consider reasonable and most of which are already
embodied in our memoranda to the Ad Hoc Committee....
That revenue should be
allocated strictly on the basis of derivation; that is to say after the
Federal Government has deducted its own share for its own services the rest
should be allocated to the regions to which they are attributable.
That the existing public debt
of the Federation should become the responsibility of the regions on the basis
of the location of the projects in respect of each debt whether internal or
external.
That each region should have
and control its own militia and police force.
That, with immediate effect,
all military personnel should be posted to their regions of origin....
If we are to live in harmony
one with another as Nigerians it is imperative that these demands and others
which are not related, should be met without further delay by those who have
hitherto resisted them. To those who may argue that the acceptance of these
demands will amount to transforming Nigeria into a federation with a weak
central government, my comment is that any link however tenuous, which keeps
the East in the Nigerian union, is better in my view than no link at all.
Before the Western delegates
went to Lagos to attend the meetings of the ad hoc committee, they were given
a clear mandate that if any region should opt out of the Federation of
Nigeria, then the Federation should be considered to be at an end, and that
the Western Region and Lagos should also opt out of it. It would then be up to
Western Nigeria and Lagos as an independent sovereign state to enter into
association with any of the Nigerian units of its own choosing, and on terms
mutually acceptable to them. I see no reason for departing from this mandate.
If any region in Nigeria considers itself strong enough to compel us to enter
into association with it on its own terms, I would only wish such a region
luck. But such luck, I must warn, will, in the long run be no better than that
which has attended the doings of all colonial powers down the ages.
This much I must say in addition, on this point. We have
neither military might nor the overwhelming advantage of numbers here in
Western Nigeria and Lagos. But we have justice of a noble and imperishable
cause on our side, namely: the right of a people to unfettered
self-determination. If this is so, then God is on our side, and if God is with
us then we have nothing whatsoever in this world to fear.
The fourth imperative, and
the second conditional one has been fully dealt with in my recent letter to
the Military Governor of Western Nigeria, Col. Robert Adebayo, and in the
representation which your deputation made last year to the head of the Federal
Military Government, Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon. As a matter of fact, as far back
as November last year a smaller meeting of leaders of thought in this Region
decided that unless certain things were done, we would no longer participate
in the meeting of the ad hoc committee. But since then, not even one of our
legitimate requests has been granted. I will, therefore, take no more of your
time in making further comments on a point with which you are well familiar.
As soon as our humble and earnest requests are met, I shall be ready to take
my place on the ad hoc committee. But certainly, not before.
In closing, I have this piece
of advice to give. In order to resolve amiably and in the best interests of
all Nigerians certain attributes are required on the part of Nigerian leaders,
military as well as non-military leaders alike, namely: vision, realism and
unselfishness. But above all , what will keep Nigerian leaders in the North
and East unwaveringly in the path of wisdom, realism and moderation is courage
and steadfastness on the part of Yoruba people in the course of what they
sincerely believe to be right, equitable and just. In the past five years we
in the West and Lagos have shown that we possess these qualities in a large
measure. If we demonstrate them again as we did in the past, calmly and
heroically, we will save Nigeria from further bloodshed and imminent wreck
and, at the same time, preserve our freedom and self-respect into the bargain.
May God rule and guide our
deliberations here, and endow all the Nigerian leaders with the vision,
realism, and unselfishness as well as courage and steadfastness in the course
of truth, which the present circumstances demand."
